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Abstract 
 
This paper examines, from a historical and comparative perspective, the role of truth in the 
South African law of defamation. In order to understand to what extent the law of South 
Africa might represent a mixture of civilian and common-law thinking, it first sets out the 
viewpoint of, on the one hand, Roman and Roman-Dutch law and, on the other hand, English 
law. Against this background, the dominant position of South African law appears avowedly 
civilian, a stand explained by the fact that the South African law of defamation really is a law 
of verbal insults, as in Rome, rather than a law of injuries to deserved reputation, as in 
England. However, an interesting dissident strand in favour of the sufficiency of truth can be 
seen to exist in the background, which is explored. This dissenting strand is certainly English 
in substance, but this does not entail that it has English roots.   
 
Keywords 
Defamation, verbal injuries, truth, veritas, public benefit, South African law, actio iniuriarum 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                        University of Edinburgh School of Law Working Paper No 2011/39
   
  
Page 1 of 29 
 
‘A man of bad character has not so much to lose’:  Truth as a defence in the 
South African law of defamation 
 
Eric Descheemaeker
1
 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
  
[452] Whether the truth of a statement lowering the estimation of the person to whom it refers 
in the eyes of others exonerates the defendant in an action for defamation – in other words, 
whether veritas convicii excusat –2 is a question that, from a comparative perspective, has 
attracted ferociously polarised answers. There is no agreement on this point between legal 
systems; no agreement (and often little willingness to agree to disagree) among scholars as to 
what the law should be; in fact, there is a surprising degree of uncertainty in some 
jurisdictions as to what the law actually says on the issue.  
 Does ‘the truth excuse the defamation’? At a very high level of generality, it is fair to 
say that the position of the common-law tradition has consistently been to consider that, in 
civil actions,
 3
 the truthful character of a defamatory – i.e., in the categories of the common 
law, slanderous or libellous – statement justifies its utterance. As counsel for the defendant 
already put it in a 13
th
 century case before an English local court, ‘veritas non est defamatio’.4 
On the other hand, the Roman-law tradition – where the civil redress for defamatory 
statements developed and, at least for a long time, continued to exist within the wider context 
of the law of iniuriae, that is to say, of insults [453] – never accepted truth as a defence in and 
by itself. If truth was to be relevant, it would normally be in conjunction with another factor – 
for example, an element of public benefit – or as evidence of something else which would be 
what in fact mattered – in particular, the absence of the required mental state. In spite of all 
manner of low-level complications, and even though Romanist learning always existed in the 
background as English law developed into a separate legal tradition, a clear dividing line can 
                                                 
1
 Maîtrise DEA (Sorb), LLM (Lond) DPhil (Oxon). I am grateful to Helen Scott (University of Cape 
Town) for her ongoing help in sharpening my thoughts on the issue and for the use of her notes prepared for the 
BCL course on the Roman Law of Delict. Two anonymous referees saved me from further errors. 
2
 This is the traditional Scottish formulation (imported from canon law): see eg Hamilton v Rutherford 
(1771) Mor 13924, Hailes 439. Convicium is used here in the general sense of slander or defamatory words, not 
in the technical sense of a convicium in Roman law (on which see below, note 11).  
3
 Criminal defamation is excluded from the scope of this study because it is obvious – and undisputed – 
that the law of criminal defamation is pursuing different objectives from the civil law. It is therefore 
unsurprising, but rather uninteresting, that in all legal systems it has tended to have a conflicting position on the 
plea of veritas (see below, note 34). 
4
 2 Selden Society 82 (1294). The record has the word spelt ‘defamacio’. On the significance of this 
statement in terms of protected interests, see below, 11. 
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be observed on this question between what English-language scholarship calls the ‘civil law’ 
and the ‘common law’. 
 For this reason, the examination of so-called ‘mixed’ legal systems, where elements of 
both traditions combined to give rise to the modern law, is almost bound to be of considerable 
interest: confronted with two conflicting positions on truth – justification in itself or not –
within two analytical framework that did not easily fit with one another – the law of slander 
and libel on the one hand, the actio iniuriarum on the other – how would these legal systems 
develop and what coherence of their own, if any, would they reach? This is what this paper 
sets out to explore in the context of one of the two leading uncodified mixed jurisdictions: 
South Africa. Because the main purpose is to analyse the position of the modern law against 
the background of its two possible sources, however, the first half of the paper will be devoted 
to setting out the position of Roman law and English law. While the latter is relatively 
straightforward, the former is a matter of significant controversy and will need to be examined 
in more detail. The sort of ‘mixture’, if indeed it was a mixture, which South African law has 
operated, will then be considered.  
 
 
II THE BACKGROUND: ROMAN LAW AND ENGLISH LAW 
 
(1)  Roman law 
 
(a)  The analytical framework 
 
Even though the expression has commonly been employed, perhaps most famously by 
Daube,
5
 there is nothing self-evident in speaking of a ‘Roman law of defamation’. Prima 
facie, what we observe if we approach Roman law in its mature, classical age on its own 
terms and look for a functional equivalent to what we would call a law of defamation is the 
civil wrong of iniuria
6
 (complemented by the legal institution known as libellus famosus, 
which can be ignored for the present purposes because it would have led, in [454] modern 
                                                 
5
 D Daube ‘Ne quid infamandi causa fiat. The Roman Law of Defamation’ in D Daube Collected 
Studies in Roman Law (1991) 465 (originally published in Atti del Congresso di Verona 1948 vol 3 (1951) 413). 
See also M de Villiers ‘The Roman Law of Defamation’ (1900) 17 Cape LJ 245; id ‘The Roman Law of 
Defamation’ (1918) 34 LQR 412. 
6
 Literally, ‘iniuria’ means ‘not-right’, ‘wrong’, ‘unlawful conduct’, ‘injustice’; in its specialised sense 
of ‘contumelia’ (D.47.10.1 pr.; J.4.4 pr.), it has been variously translated with ‘outrage’, ‘insult’ or ‘contempt’. 
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terms, to a purely criminal response of the law.) In the classical law, iniuria had grown to such 
an extent from its – disputed – origins as prima facie to encompass any act whatever of the 
defendant which showed a contumelious disregard for the claimant, thereby injuring his 
feelings. A crucial ingredient of liability, which was implicit in the praetor’s Edict but was 
brought to the fore by legal writers, would have been the mental element which came to be 
known as ‘animus iniuriandi’ – the term itself is post-classical –,7 an undefined and difficult 
concept which we can provisionally translate with ‘intention to insult’.8 
 The question of the interests which iniuria protected as a wrong permeates this paper 
and will need to be returned to; but it is useful to mention at the outset Ulpian’s statement 
according to which iniuria consisted in an injury to either corpus (physical integrity), fama 
(good name, reputation, fame, renown) or dignitas (dignity, worth, status, standing).
9
 If we 
accept that the law of defamation is the law that pertains to injuries to reputation, which is a 
proposition that would be readily accepted in the context of both South African and English 
law, what we then have as we approach Roman law on its own terms is a law of defamation 
which operates under the general heading of a law of insults (iniuriae). This section of the law 
of iniuria which dealt with injuries to fama – in other words, the ‘Roman law of defamation’ – 
was the subject-matter of a specialised edict, known by its opening words as the edict ‘ne quid 
infamandi causa fiat’, in short ‘ne quid’ (literally, ‘let nothing be done to bring disgrace [upon 
another]’).10,11 The relationship between the special edict dealing with injuries to reputation 
and the general edict on iniuriae is a matter of ongoing controversy; but there is no need for us 
to take a stance here since it is not disputed that, by the classical age at the latest, the special 
edict operated as an island of liability existing within the wider context of the delict of iniuria, 
itself a general wrong unified by the concept of contumelia. For the [455] present purpose, 
                                                 
7
 F Schulz Classical Roman Law (1951) 597; cf R Zimmermann The Law of Obligations: Roman 
Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (1996) 1059–61. For instance, in D.47.10.3.1, Ulpian speaks alternatively 
of ‘dolus’ and ‘affectus facientis’. An interesting terminological overview is provided in C F Amerasinghe 
Defamation and Other Aspects of the Actio Iniuriarum in Roman-Dutch Law (c 1968) 342. 
8
 On animus, see below, 6. 
9
 D.47.10.1.2 (Ulpian, 56 Edict). 
10
 For the wording of the edict and the pattern formula attached to it, see D.47.10.15.25 (Ulpian, 77 
Edict); Collatio 2.6.5, D Daube op cit note 5 at 465; O Lenel Das Edictum perpetuum 3 ed (1927) 401. On the 
relationship with the general edict, see D.47.10.15.26 (Ulpian, 77 Edict); H Scott ‘Omnes unius aestimemus 
assis: A Note on Liability for Defamation in Catullus V’ (2006) 3 Roman Legal Tradition 95 at 100–104. 
11
 The edict on convicium – or public clamour – would not have been directly relevant because, even 
though the words it visited would often be defamatory, it did not matter whether they were or not, because the 
gist of the action lay in their clamorous, rather than defamatory, character: see D.47.10.15.5 (Ulpian, 77 Edict: 
ad infamiam vel invidiam). It seems certain that, by the classical age, convicium was regarded as a form of 
iniuria (D.47.10.15.4; convicii are dealt with within title 47.10 in the Digest, headed ‘de iniuriis et libellis 
famosis’). 
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therefore, the Roman law of defamation can be taken to mean the law secreted under the 
heading of the edict ne quid.  
 
(b)  The defence of truth 
 
In an action for iniuria under the edict ne quid, would the fact that the incrimination carried by 
the contumelious words, or acts, complained of was in actuality true have been relevant to the 
outcome of the action; and if so how? This question has been and remains vexed. Whatever 
answer is provided will typically draw from a combination of two elements: first, an exegesis 
of D.47.10.18 pr. (from Paul, 55 Edict), the only prima facie relevant fragment in the 
sources;
12
 second, deductions made from a priori considerations pertaining to the law of 
iniuria or of defamation.  
 The Paulian snippet reads as follows: 
 
Eum, qui nocentem infamavit, non esse bonum aequum ob eam rem condemnari: 
peccata enim nocentium nota esse et oportere et expedire. 
 
It is not right and just that any one who has defamed a guilty person should on that 
account be condemned; for it is both proper and expedient that the misdeeds of 
delinquents should be known.
13
 
 
Interpretations. How is this to be understood? The fragment has given rise to a considerable 
number of conflicting interpretations both during the ius commune and on the part of modern 
Roman scholars. A number of English scholars, perhaps overly prompt to assume identity 
with the position of the common law, read in it a general defence of veritas;
14
 other writers, 
                                                 
12
 On Codex 9.35.5, see below, 32.  
13
 Translation Melius de Villiers cited in J Burchell The Law of Defamation in South Africa (1985) 206. 
Compare other translations: ‘It is not right or just to condemn anyone for bringing  a guilty person into disrepute, 
for it is necessary and proper for the offences of guilty persons to be known’ (translation Kolbert cited in 
Burchell op cit at 206); ‘It would not be right and proper that a person should be condemned for putting to shame 
a wrongdoer; for the sins of those who do wrong should be noted and noised abroad’ (translation Pennsylvania 
Digest). 
14
 Eg J Crook Law and Life of Rome (1984) 253, describing this position as ‘customary’ (although he 
himself opposed it); W W Buckland The Main Institutions of Roman Private Law (1931) 338; W Hunter A 
Systematic and Historical Exposition of Roman Law in the Order of a Code 4 ed (1903) 149 (cited by the 
minority in Preller v Schultz 10 Cape LJ 175 at 176, on which see below, 23). Outside English writers, see eg 
Amerasinghe op cit note 7 at 82 and 340 (although the author recognised a possibility that the defence of truth 
might be lost). 
                                        University of Edinburgh School of Law Working Paper No 2011/39
   
  
Page 5 of 29 
 
probably reading back what became the dominant interpretation of the ius commune, took it 
as evidence of the fact that truth for the public benefit justified, but not truth simpliciter.
15
 In 
turn, the nature of this ‘public benefit’ – however that element [456] be phrased – could be 
given a wide variety of interpretations.
16
 If we ignore the rare, and obviously ill-thought, 
suggestion that truth would never be relevant,
17
 we find at the most restrictive end of the 
spectrum Grotius, for whom the only situation where the truth could be spoken even though it 
was prima facie defamatory of another was ‘when information is given to the authorities with 
a view to the punishment of crime’.18 More mainstream was the interpretation according to 
which wrongdoers, in the sense of criminals (the meaning ascribed to ‘nocentes’ in Paul),19 
could be spoken the truth about – even if they had already been convicted – but not those who 
had committed a non-criminal, possibly non-blameworthy act, or whose faulty character or 
physique, rather than actions, was the subject-matter of the disputed words. At the other end 
of the spectrum, Matthaeus might have been the most favourably disposed towards truth, even 
though he evidently required more than truth simpliciter to justify.
20
 There is no need to 
examine these interpretations in detail here, because it suffices for our purpose to note that 
almost all revolved around the need for an element of good for the community over and above 
truth to justify the author of the injurious statement, the few others requiring the absence of 
animus iniuriandi.  
  
A hypothesis. This paper not being concerned primarily with Roman law, I will state my own 
understanding as a hypothesis, without trying to demonstrate it systematically – which, given 
the textual evidence, might not be possible at all. This understanding is that the latter above 
view, namely, that only the absence of animus displaced the prima facie finding of liability 
                                                 
15
 Eg T Starkie A Treatise on the Law of Slander and Libel, and Incidentally of Malicious Prosecutions 
2 ed vol 1 (1830) xxxv, Lord MacKenzie Studies in Roman Law 6 ed (1886) 262 (cited by minority in Preller v 
Schultz op cit note 14); and see note below for Roman-Dutch and Roman-Scotch authorities. 
16
 For an overview of (mostly Roman-Scotch) writers from the ius commune, see J Blackie 
‘Defamation’ in K Reid and R Zimmermann (eds) A History of Private Law in Scotland vol 2 (2000) 666–8; for 
Roman-Dutch writers, see M de Villiers The Roman and Roman-Dutch Law of Injuries (1899) 105–6 and 119 
(the latter from Preller v Schulz op cit note 14); also B Ranchod Foundations of the South African Law of 
Defamation (1972) 49–53, 84–9; Sparks v Hart (1833) 3 Menz 3 at 4–5. 
17
 Blackie op cit note 16 at 667. 
18
 H Grotius The Jurisprudence of Holland (tr R W Lee) (1926) 481. This can be regarded, in modern 
English terms, as a form of absolute privilege.  
19
 ‘Nocens’ was an untechnical Latin term. Rather like ‘guilty’ in English, it could be used in a narrower 
sense to mean guilty of a legal offence (like one is ‘guilty’ of murder or reckless driving), or in a wider sense to 
denote responsibility for any negatively connoted behaviour or even non-behavioural feature (like one might be 
‘guilty’ of having a poor sense of fashion). 
20
 A Matthaeus On Crimes. A Commentary on Books XLVII and XLVIII of the Digest (ed and tr M L 
Hewett and B C Stoop) vol 1 (1987) esp at 109.  
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prompted by defamatory conduct, represents the position of the classical Roman law of 
defamation. On this reading, truth itself was irrelevant to an action under the edict ne quid. If 
the incrimination made was defamatory – in the sense of impinging upon the plaintiff’s fama, 
i.e. his reputation in the eyes of others – and if they were spoken with an intention to insult the 
[457] plaintiff, then the defendant would be liable. On the other hand, whenever no such 
animus was found, the defendant would escape liability because the injury would not be 
contumelious and thus not wrongful.  
 However, truth, while in itself transparent, might have become indirectly relevant 
insofar as it would have contributed to negate the element of malice. The two limbs of this 
proposition need to be considered in some detail. First, the presence of truth is not sufficient 
evidence of the lack of animus iniuriandi for, clearly, one might speak the truth
21
 with or 
without an intent to insult the claimant – that is to say, an evil intention towards him. This evil 
intent seems to be what the sources describe, in a fragmentary way, by ‘animus iniuriandi’ (or 
rather whatever expression is used to speak of the mental element of the wrong of iniuria): it 
is not a state of consciousness vis-à-vis the infliction of an injury to the plaintiff’s reputation – 
which in modern English terms we might call ‘malice-in-law’; but neither is it the motive 
behind the infliction of the injury, at least not in the sense of the ‘ultimate object sought to be 
attained by the act’22 (which, in both Roman and English law, has consistently been regarded 
as irrelevant); rather, it is something close to the ‘malice-in-fact’ of English law, a 
consciousness of wrongfulness, an ill-will towards the claimant which, in the context of 
iniuria, has been described by Birks as ‘hubris’, i.e. ‘an over-confident exaltation of the self ... 
as where one person has so high a view of his own importance as to allow himself to commit 
acts of wanton violence or other outrages upon another’.23 
 Second, while truth is not sufficient to prove the absence of such hubris, it is clearly 
relevant to the enquiry. In order to unpack this, it might be easiest to reason from first 
principles on defamatory but true words. (By ‘true’, in order not to bring in difficulties which 
the Romans did not address, I will mean both objectively true and believed to be true; and by 
‘defamatory’, I mean which is liable to injure the fama of the person to whom they refer – 
whether that reputation be merited or not.) To take a simple example, the claimant who has 
been called a ‘thief’ by the defendant, thereby injuring his fama, is in fact a thief, and is so 
                                                 
21
 Or what is believed to be true: the Roman sources did not investigate any possible discrepancy 
between the two. 
22
 M de Villiers ‘Malice in the English and Roman Law of Defamation’ (1901) 18 LQR 388 at 388. 
23
 P Birks ‘Harassment and Hubris: The Right to an Equality of Respect’ (1997) 32 Irish Jurist (NS) 1 at 8. 
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believed to be by the defendant. In the abstract, this situation can be analysed in a number of 
different ways. The first issue is whether the plaintiff-thief has suffered any prima facie 
actionable loss or, to put the same question differently, whether a legally protected interest of 
his has been encroached upon. Here, some English lawyers might answer to the negative, on 
the basis that what the law protects really is deserved reputation. The ‘thief’ who is a thief has 
suffered no injury in the sense of the [458] violation of a right of his: this is the end of the 
story as far as his endeavour to seek redress in the law of defamation is concerned.  
 This, however, is not the dominant approach of the common law, which would rather 
say that an injury – to reputation in the wider sense – has indeed been suffered, but that it was 
justified by the truth of the incrimination. It would not have been the approach of Roman law 
either, where fama transparently meant (as ‘reputation’ does in ordinary parlance) a good 
esteem in the eyes of others, whether that good esteem be deserved or not. There is, then, a 
prima facie injury. However, it seems clear that no legal system could maintain that true 
words are always actionable if they injure reputation in that wider sense: this would conflict 
too evidently with the good of the community.
24
 At best, it might want to say that they are 
always prima facie actionable; but defences must be available, which can reverse this 
provisional finding of liability. How, then, do we define these defences? This can be done 
either in terms of exclusion of unlawfulness or exclusion of fault (in the sense of a mental 
state): here, it is convenient to follow Burchell’s terminology and call the former a 
‘justification’ and the latter an ‘excuse’.25  
Intuitively, a legal system which does not accept that anyone could always call a thief 
a ‘thief’ and get away with it – because (as the New South Wales Law Reform Commission 
would put it many centuries later in perhaps the most succinct way) ‘gratuitous destruction of 
reputation is wrong, even if the matter published is true’ –26 such a system will insist that 
there should exist a sufficient common or greater good, served or caused or achieved by the 
attack, to outweigh and thus ‘justify’ the harm suffered. In other words, to follow the above 
                                                 
24
 On the other hand, it is tenable for a legal system to say that true words are never actionable in 
defamation. But this does not mean that they will not be actionable as something else. Indeed, it is difficult to see 
how a legal system, even on the non-criminal side of the law, could justify the speaking of true words in all 
circumstances. Yet it is certainly possible, as the example of English law until 1974 show, to say that they never 
give rise to an action for the infringement of reputation, ie ‘in defamation’. Whether this is just is an altogether 
separate question that need not be addressed here. 
25
 Burchell op cit note 13 at 34. Naturally, ‘justification’ must not be confused in that context with the 
specific defence of truth or truth for the public benefit. 
26
 New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Defamation (Report 11) (1971) § 64. This is the one 
leading argument that the anti-veritas cohort has put forward over centuries. 
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phrasing, the attack should not be ‘gratuitous’. What this exactly entails might be difficult to 
flesh out; but the basic idea is clear and intuitive enough. 
 In turn, this requirement that the attack should not be gratuitous can be cast in two 
different ways which, at least in the great majority of cases, will overlap: it can be phrased in 
terms of an element of public benefit – whatever the precise words used and meaning ascribed 
to them – or in terms of a mental disposition on the defendant’s part: the attack is not 
gratuitous either because it serves a good purpose or because it is not [459] motivated by 
sheer malice. Following the above terminology, the former relates to a justification (objective 
circumstances excluding unlawfulness) and the latter to an excuse (subjective mental state 
excluding fault).  
To a large extent, one is the reverse side of the other. Thus, the defendant might have 
called the plaintiff a ‘thief’ because he wanted to bring him to a deserved punishment, or to 
protect the community against further wrongdoing on his part, or otherwise serve the good of 
the commonwealth; or he might have done it with no such good in mind. If he did not, then it 
is very likely, if not almost certain, that he will have been actuated by ill-will against the 
claimant, i.e. an intention to insult him or, to phrase it differently, a positive desire to cause 
him an injury.
27
 This is what the post-classical writers would have called animus iniuriandi. 
Although the correspondence is not perfect – for it still possible to speak truth that is in the 
public interest with spiteful intent and conversely to say, without any intention to insult, 
something which is true yet not objectively in the public interest – still, there is such a degree 
of overlap between ‘truth for the public benefit’ (or ‘in the public interest’: an objective 
defence negating unlawfulness) and lack of wrongful intent (a subjective defence negating 
fault) that it is very easy to see how, as far as issues of truth or lack thereof are concerned, the 
two could be used almost interchangeably by writers. In most cases, they would yield the 
same result. 
  
A hypothesis (continued): the position of Roman law. As was seen, most authors of the ius 
commune reasoned in terms of an objective defence of public benefit negating unlawfulness. 
The rebuttal of animus iniuriandi, when it was mentioned, would simply be the basis on which 
truth for the public benefit was justified. Animus iniuriandi having been pushed into the 
background, the debate would then move on to the definition of that element of public good.  
                                                 
27
 Here, I follow De Villiers’ terminology and distinguish desire from, on the one hand, will or intention 
and, on the other hand, motive. See De Villiers op cit note 22 at 388–9. 
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But reading this crystallisation back into the Roman law appears to be anachronistic 
and does not make sense within the context of the edict ne quid. To understand this, we need 
to recognise the specificity of that edict. Contrary to the other specialized edicts on iniuria, 
such as convicium or de adtemptata pudicitia, ne quid did not visit a specific type of conduct: 
prima facie any act, whether words or other conduct, can bring disgrace to another. As Daube 
put it, ‘a man may undermine another man’s reputation by an immense variety of means. He 
may do it by a straightforward statement. But he may also do it by oblique remarks, or even 
without any remarks’.28 This raised specific problems when it came to the delineation of 
wrongful conduct. Self-evidently, not every conduct which infringes one of the interests 
protected by iniuria (whether through the general or a specialized [460] edict) should be 
actionable. Just as not every public clamour or attempt to seduce should be characterized as 
wrongful, so not every conduct which brings disgrace upon another ought to be actionable. In 
the case of convicium or de adtemptata pudicitia, the way the praetor dealt with this question 
was by limiting actionability to such facts that were described as ‘contrary to public morals’: 
adversus (or contra) bonos mores.
29
 The criterion was objective: only conduct that crossed the 
line of socially unacceptable conduct gave rise to an action. The objectiveness of the criterion 
would not have caused practical difficulties, because the specificity of the conduct visited by 
the edicts would have almost invariably entailed consciousness of wrongfulness on the 
defendant’s part.  
 While theoretically possible, adopting such an approach in the case of defamatory 
incriminations under the edict ne quid would have had, given the sheer width of potentially 
liability-creating conduct, the practical and highly undesirable effect of turning the judge into 
an all-around censor of social behaviour.
30
 In modern terms, we might want to say that this 
would have caused a considerable problem of legal certainty. Daube’s argument, which seems 
entirely right, is that the praetor resolved this difficulty by using the defendant’s intention as 
the means to control liability: actionability would turn on the latter’s intention to bring 
disgrace upon the plaintiff – infamandi causa. He would be liable if, but only if, it had been 
his purpose in acting to infringe the fama of the defendant. In other words, if Daube is right, 
what would come to be known as animus iniuriandi emerged in the context of ne quid as a 
control mechanism alternative to public morals to separate out wrongful from non-wrongful 
                                                 
28
 Daube op cit note 5 at 468. 
29
 See, for convicium, D.47.10.15.2 (Ulpian, 77 Edict); for de adtemptata pudicitia, Lenel op cit note 10 
at 400. 
30
 Daube op cit note 5 at 468. 
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behaviour. (The general edict cannot be straightforwardly reconstructed as having followed 
one or the other approach; but Helen Scott’s view that the surviving texts show a tension 
between the objective boni mores as an older criterion of liability and animus iniuriandi as a 
later, subjective, criterion is both plausible and attractive.) 
 If it is true that animus iniuriandi was an alternative to boni mores as a control 
mechanism in the context of the edict ne quid – which fits very well with the available textual 
evidence, writers never speaking of ‘public morals’ in the context of passages clearly or even 
possibly referring to that edict –,31 it follows that liability in the Roman law of defamation 
would have revolved exclusively around the subjective criterion of intention to insult:
32
 
animus iniuriandi would have invariably been an ingredient of liability and, provided [461] 
that the conduct complained of was objectively defamatory, only the absence of such an 
intention to cause the iniuria to the claimant would have relieved the defendant of his liability. 
Truth was thus irrelevant in itself, although indirectly relevant insofar as it would help 
evidence that the defendant’s purpose in making the incrimination had not been to insult the 
plaintiff but, for instance, to make the ‘misdeed of delinquents … known’. If this is right, then 
the crystallization of (subjective) animus into an (objective) defence of ‘truth for the public 
benefit’ would have been a post-Roman – and imperfectly accurate – ‘objectivization’ of the 
classical position.  
 
(2)  English law 
 
The position of English law can be dealt with more succinctly, in part because there are 
sufficient records to remove most elements of speculation, and also because it has already 
been dealt with in other fora.
33
 The English (civil) law of defamation is the reunion, in 
mathematical terms, of the two causes of action known as slander – the action of trespass 
upon the case for words – and libel. Whereas the law of criminal libel, like the Roman law of 
libelli famosi (at least until the time of Justinian), did not recognise truth as an exculpating 
                                                 
31
 I am following the list of texts provided, in three groups, in Daube op cit note 5 at 471–84.  
32
 This position is strengthened by C.9.35.5, which applied to convicium not iniuria famae, but clearly 
states that absence of any intention to insult exculpated the defendant from liability (‘Si non convicii consilio te 
aliquid iniuriosum dixisse probare potes, fides veri a calumnia te defendit’). Contra De Villiers op cit note 16 at 
87. 
33
 Including, most recently, my own paper: E Descheemaeker ‘ “Veritas non est defamatio”? Truth as a 
Defence in the Law of Defamation’ (2011) 31 Legal Studies 1.  
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factor –34 which is unsurprising because it exists to protect different, public, interests, which 
are not concerned with the falsity of the statement but rather its disruptive effect on the fabric 
of society – the law of civil libel and of slander has, by and large, always accepted that truth 
was a defence in and by itself. This position was best encapsulated in the modern age by 
Littledale J’s statement in M’Pherson v Daniels in 1829 – ‘the law will not permit a man to 
recover damages in respect of an injury to a character which he either does not, or ought not, 
to possess’ –;35 but it goes back all the way to the very beginnings of the action of slander.36 
Doctrinally, as alluded to, there are two ways of understanding the position of English law: 
one is that defamation is an attack on reputation, i.e. the esteem – deemed  by default to be 
good – in which the plaintiff is held in the community, but the truth of the statement provides 
a good justification that rebuts the prima facie finding of liability; the other (which I favour), 
that defamation is by definition an attack on deserved reputation and, consequently, that a 
defamatory statement is by nature false. On this view, a true statement cannot, by 
construction, be defamatory; it therefore does not need to be ‘excused’: veritas non est 
defamatio. 
 To this dominant thread has echoed, through the centuries, a ‘dissident’ voice. For the 
most part, this dissent has been de lege ferenda. Truth, some [462] have argued, ought not to 
always be a defence because, again, ‘gratuitous destruction of reputation is wrong’.37 In 
particular, individuals ought to be allowed to live down a life of past wrongdoing without the 
fear of their old offences being raked up, typically for malicious – even blackmailing – 
purposes.
38
 De lege lata, the argument has not been met with much success on the civil side of 
the law; but it can be observed as early as 1533 in the position of Fitzjames CJ in Legat v Bull 
–39 the one case in the history of English law where the defence of veritas was actually 
                                                 
34
 In short, truth was – at least on the face of the record – irrelevant until 1843; since then, ‘truth in the 
public benefit’ has been a valid defence (Libel Act 1843, s 6). See Law Commission, Working Paper No. 84: 
Criminal Libel (1982) §§ 2.1–2.22.  
35
 M’Pherson v Daniels (1829) 10 B & C 263, 109 ER 448. 
36
 See Reymond v Lord Fitzwauter (King’s Bench, 6 October 1521), 2 Spelman Reports 2; Legat v Bull 
(King’s Bench, Trinity Term 1533), 1 Spelman Reports 6. 
37
 Above, 7. 
38
 For the Australian story, see P Mitchell ‘The Foundations of Australian Defamation Law’ (2006) 28 
Sydney LR (2006) 477 at 492-5. A highly specific context existed in New South Wales, marked by the existence 
of newspapers which specialized in blackmailing settlers (of which a significant proportion would have consisted 
of former convicts) with threats to reveal their sinful past in print unless they paid up. For an echo of this view in 
a South African context, see below, 20 and 26. 
39
 Op cit note 36 at 6: an imputation of crime, even if true, could only be made ‘in the interest of 
justice’. Compare the position of Fitzherbert J: ‘if it is true, he [the defendant] could well speak it where and 
when he pleases’ (ibid). 
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disputed on the Bench. It resurfaced during the discussion of the Libel Bill 1791
40
 and then of 
what would become the Libel Act 1843,
41
 finally to find partial recognition in s 8(5) of the 
Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974,
42
 which removes the defence of truth in defamation 
actions when the statement complained of was the malicious publication of a past conviction 
now regarded as ‘spent’.43 To date, the 1974 Act remains the one, narrow, exception to the 
otherwise firmly established rule that, as far as civil actions for defamation in English law are 
concerned, veritas convicii excusat.  
 I have argued elsewhere that this departure from the principle is an oblique attempt on 
the part of English law to protect, not reputation, but privacy (in Roman terms, a species of 
dignitas).
44
 In a legal system where there is no direct protection of that interest, any protection 
will have to be indirect; and one ‘solution’ English law has adopted has been to exploit an 
action which, according to its own rhetoric, is geared at the protection of reputation. This is 
one example, among others, of how the English law of defamation has become an embryo of 
actio iniuriarum in its own right – a process that I have argued is wrong for several reasons.45 
One of them can be seen in its effect on truth. As a matter of fact, it seems an analytical 
necessity to say that a [463] true statement cannot impinge on someone’s deserved reputation. 
On the other hand, if what is complained of is that the statement violated the defendant’s 
dignity, then truth has to be irrelevant: broadcasting to the world the serological status of an 
HIV+ person or taunting them for their poverty or hunch back is – if one accepts that this is 
wrong – wrong regardless of truth; arguably it is in fact because these statements are true that 
they are wrong (if they were false, they would still be wrong, but for a completely different 
reason).  
 It is thus relatively easy to understand how an action that aims to protect both fama 
and dignitas, as the Roman actio iniuriarum did and, to a slight extent, the English action on 
defamation does, will end up having a defence of truth set somewhere between the two 
extremes of ‘veritas (semper) excusat’ and ‘veritas (semper) non excusat’ – ‘truth (always) 
excuses’ and ‘truth (always) does not excuse’ – as it strives to protect interests that are pulling 
                                                 
40
 Descheemaeker op cit note 33 at 12-13.  
41
 Descheemaeker op cit note 33 at 8. 
42
 Descheemaeker op cit note 33 at 7. 
43
 Rehabilitation of Offenders Act (1974 c 53), s 8(5): ‘A defendant in any [defamation] action shall not 
... be entitled to rely upon the defence of justification if the publication is proved to have been made with 
malice’. The term ‘malice’ is not defined by the Act; but Lord Diplock (who introduced the word in the Bill) 
made it clear during the preparatory works that he meant it in the sense defined by himself earlier the same year 
in Horrocks v Lowe [1975] AC 135 at 149 (HL Deb 24 July 1974 vol 353 cc1806-52 at 1812). 
44
 Descheemaeker op cit note 33 at 17ff. 
45
 Descheemaeker op cit note 33 at 18-19. 
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in opposite directions in this respect: something like truth for the public benefit or truth unless 
it is malicious. Arguably, such a system ends up losing on both counts, as this sort of 
compromise mixes two logics and is left with none of its own. If this is true, it follows that the 
protection of these conflicting interests must be left to separate causes of action. (It might 
even be the case – but this is not the place to argue this point – that, as English law did in fact 
appear to believe until comparatively recently, there should be no direct legal protection of 
privacy at all: only of deserved reputation, with its necessary corollary, a defence of veritas.) 
 
 
III SOUTH AFRICAN LAW AT THE CROSSROADS? 
 
We are now in a position to turn our attention to the mixed legal system of South Africa to see 
whether, and if so to what extent, it amounts on this point to a ‘mixture’ of Roman and 
English law. To cut a long but well-known story short, South African law was originally 
Roman-Dutch law as brought over from Europe by the Dutch colonists: a mixture of Roman 
learning, as revisited by medieval commentators, and Dutch customs. The Dutch were later 
defeated – in several phases – by the British, who recognised the validity by default of the 
substantive Roman-Dutch law but anglicised procedure and made English the language of the 
administration of justice. The presence of English learning and English materials, as well as 
the fact that the English tongue utilises words which correspond to concepts already employed 
by the common law of England and Wales, meant that it was all but inevitable that at least 
some infiltration of English law would happen at the substantive level as well. The avowed 
aim of many in the legal community was in fact that there would be more than ‘some’ of it.46 
If one thing has to strike the outside observer of South African law on the particular point 
under scrutiny in this paper, it is how little of it did in fact happen. The [464] South African 
law of defamation might have been ‘the focal point of the purist-pragmatist controversy’;47 
but on this point it remained avowedly Roman-Dutch. 
 
                                                 
46
 E Fagan ‘Roman-Dutch Law in its South-African Historical Context’ in R Zimmermann and D Visser 
(eds) Southern Cross (1996) Ch 1.  
47
 H J Erasmus, ‘The Interaction of Substantive Law and Procedure’ in R Zimmermann and D Visser 
(eds) Southern Cross (1996), 157–60. By ‘purism’ (on which see E Fagan op cit note 46 at 60–4) is meant the 
endeavour on the part of some, especially Afrikaans-speaking scholars and judges, to root out the ‘impure’ 
English additions to the Roman-Dutch system. By ‘pragmatism’ is meant the willingness to draw from English 
sources, regarded as more suited on the whole to the modern world, whenever the need was felt to depart from 
the customary rules of Roman-Dutch law. 
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(1)  The structural framework 
  
To the present day, the actio iniuriarum remains a category within South African law. Both 
courts and legal scholars reason in terms of iniuria. However, under the combined influence 
of Grotius – who built upon Roman scholarship to bring to the fore the various interests 
protected by the law, and identified ‘wrongs against honour’ as a separate category – and of 
the English law of slander and libel, South African law also thinks in terms of the wrong of 
defamation (laster in Afrikaans). But defamation, even though it is routinely regarded as a law 
unto itself that can be treated as a separate entity, is known to exist within the wider context of 
the actio iniuriarum: similarly to Roman law, it is iniuria as it applies – if possibly with its 
own specific rules – to reputation (eer). This has important consequences in that, in particular, 
animus iniuriandi remains in ordinary cases a requirement for liability. Although its necessity 
was strongly attacked, in particular over the first half of the twentieth century (at the same 
time as English law moved towards a paradigm of strict liability), it never disappeared and – 
whatever exactly animus is taken to mean –48 it has been clear again for half a century that it 
is not a hollow fiction and it is still an ingredient of liability: there can normally be no liability 
for defamation-iniuria in South African law without animus iniuriandi.
49
 This animus is not 
uncommonly called ‘malice’, although the literature abounds with warnings to the effect that 
the animus of Roman-Dutch law is different from the malice of English defamation law. 
 
(2)  Truth for the public benefit 
 
The reliance of South African defamation law on an action that, in its self-understanding, 
aims to protect dignity alongside reputation is unsurprisingly reflected by a defence of truth 
that meets somewhere in between the two extremes described above. The settled position of 
South African law is [465] that the defendant can escape liability in an action on defamation 
(iniuria famae) if, but only if,
50
 the words spoken were true and their utterance was ‘for the 
public benefit’. This element of public benefit is occasionally called ‘public interest’, even 
                                                 
48
 See, most recently, the important case of Le Roux v Dey [2010] ZASCA 41. 
49
 Eg Jonathan Burchell ‘The Protection of Personality Rights’ in R Zimmermann and D Visser (eds) 
Southern Cross (1996) 640–4. Mention was made of ‘ordinary cases’ because, in the context of injuries to fama, 
an exception was carved out for distributors of published material, including the press and other media (see 
Burchell op cit note 13 at 175–7). Exceptions also exist in other areas of the actio iniuriarum (see J Neethling, J 
M Potgieter and P J Visser Neethling’s Law of Personality 2 ed (2005) 58–9.  
50
 Insofar as the defence of justification or truth is concerned; there are naturally other defences 
available.  
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though it is accepted that it is different from the notion of public interest as it applies to the 
defence of fair comment.  
 
(a)  The position of courts  
 
(i) Before the Union of 1910 
 
If we look at the foundational period of South African law in the 1827-1910 period
51
 (a period 
during which there was virtually no home-grown scholarship apart from court judgments),
52
 
we find that – subject to the emergence at the end of the century of a ‘dissenting’ strand, to 
which we shall return – the defence was incorporated smoothly from Roman-Dutch law into 
the law of the land. Naturally, until the establishment of a Union of South Africa, there was 
technically no ‘South African’ law, but laws specific to the different polities established on 
the territory, whether under British or Boer control: the Cape Colony, Natal, Transvaal and 
Orange. It would however be misleading to grant equal consideration to these: the dominant 
force was unquestionably the Cape of Good Hope, where a Supreme Court had been 
established in 1828. In the absence of any colonial pronouncement, however, Roman-Dutch 
law applied in all these territories. 
  
The Cape. In the Cape Colony, we find the defence of truth for the public benefit already 
established in Mackay v Philip (1830), the first reported case of defamation in the Supreme 
Court.
53
 The phrase ‘public benefit’ (or equivalent) is not used; but the idea appears 
transparently in the judgment.
54
 The reasoning of the court is less transparent, but it does seem 
to be that truth for the public benefit rebuts the presumption of animus iniuriandi having 
arisen from the publication of the defamatory words. As to the authority for both propositions 
– as, indeed, for any other legal proposition in the case – it was Voet’s Commentary on the 
Pandects. Voet’s Commentary was a mainstream representative of the Roman-Dutch tradition 
having identified, and crystallised, the rebuttal of animus iniuriandi in terms of (among other 
                                                 
51
 1827 was the publication of the First Charter of Justice, establishing a Supreme Court in the Cape 
Colony. 1910 saw the fusion of the South African colonies into the Union of South Africa. For a brief historical 
overview, see R Zimmermann and D Visser, ‘South African Law as a Mixed Legal System’ in id Southern Cross 
(1996) 15–19; S D Girvin, ‘The Architects of the Mixed Legal System’ in ibid Ch. 3.  
52
 Zimmermann & Visser op cit note 51 at 19. 
53
 Mackay v Philip (1830) 1 Menz 455. 
54
 At 463. 
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defences) an objective justification of truth for the public benefit.
55
 Paraphrasing Paul [466] 
closely, Voet (1589–1676) interpreted D.47.10.18 pr. as meaning that he who made an 
imputation that ‘concerns the well-being of the commonwealth’56 ought not to be liable, 
contrary to he whose statement did not concern ‘the interest of the State’ – as when the matter 
related to an offence already punished or to a ‘natural defect’. This he explicitly justified on 
the basis that animus is rebutted in the former case but not the latter. The case of Mackay thus 
provides, from the very beginning, a neat summary of the South African experience: one rule 
– only truth for the public benefit justifies; one basis – the absence of animus iniuriandi; one 
authority – Voet.  
 The later case of Sparks v Hart
57
 complexified but did not alter this basic picture. In 
that case the issue was actually disputed, and counsel for both parties drew from a wider range 
of authorities. The party seeking to rely on the defence of veritas convicii excusat called on 
Grotius and Van Leeuwen as well as Voet, who was interestingly also cited by the opposite 
party along with Matthaeus, Wissenbach, Van der Keessel and some English authorities (Holt 
and Chitty). The response of the court was exactly the same as in Mackay: veritas only avails 
where it rebuts the presumption of animus, which entails that an element of public benefit – 
the phrase is still not used – must be present.  
 The same question arose anew in Botha v Brink (1878).
58
 A clearer attempt was made 
by counsel in that case to establish the defence of veritas in South African law, first by 
explaining away the Roman-Dutch authorities as being concerned with ‘criminal 
proceedings’, and then by making an appeal both to English law and to principle, its being 
‘inequitable that a person should be punished for speaking the truth’. In response, John de 
Villiers CJ returned to the Roman-Dutch writers (Voet, Groenewegen and Vinnius) to find 
that they did support the view of Mackay and Sparks. Both the validity of the rule and its basis 
– the rebuttal of animus – were affirmed in the main opinion of what is generally regarded as 
the leading South African case on the status of veritas in the law of defamation. Seemingly for 
the first time, the phrase ‘public benefit’ was used to name that additional requirement which 
was needed, over and above truth, to justify the utterance of the defamatory words 
complained of under the actio iniuriarum. This became the settled position of the Cape of 
                                                 
55
 Above, 4. 
56
 De Villiers op cit note 16 at 99. 
57
 Sparks v Hart (1833) 3 Menz 3. 
58
 Botha v Brink 1878 Buch 118. 
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Good Hope, and no willingness to re-open the debate on the part of courts can be seen after 
that.
59
 
  
[467] Other territories. The position of the Orange Free State
60
 will be considered in the next 
section, since it produced the one judgment in the history of South Africa where truth 
simpliciter was recognised as a valid defence to an action in defamation.  
 As far as Transvaal is concerned, the first case where the defence was at stake appears 
to have been Dunning v Quin in 1905.
61
 The judge referred in that case to the position of the 
Cape Supreme Court, mentioned the dissenting position of the High Court of the Orange Free 
State and then gave preference to the Cape position. When the issue resurfaced in Stanley v 
Central News Agency (1909),
62
 the Cape position was affirmed without any discussion. Later 
in the year, the case of South African Mails Syndicate v Hocking
63
 confirmed that view again, 
only substituting ‘public interest’ for ‘public benefit’. 
 There does not appear to have been any relevant case from Natal during its period as a 
separate colony.
64
 
 
(ii)  After the Union of 1910 
 
In 1910 the four colonies of the Cape, Natal, Transvaal and Orange became the single Union 
of South Africa. The common law of South Africa technically became one and, on all matters 
where it was not already the same, the question was open as to which way the law would now 
go, even though a bias towards the Cape position was almost inevitable. Indeed, as far as the 
defence of truth is concerned, the law of the Cape Colony seamlessly became the law of the 
Union. 
 The newly established Supreme Court of South Africa had to confront the question 
within its first year of existence. In Leibenguth v Van Straaten,
65
 De Villiers JP – Jacob de 
Villiers, Judge President of the Transvaal Supreme Court, not John Henry de Villiers, who 
                                                 
59
 See Meurant v Raubenheimer (1882) 1 Buch 87; Michaelis v Braun (1886) 4 SC 205; Graham v Ker 
(1892) 9 SC 185; Bloem v Zietsman (1897) 14 SC 361; Clarke & Co v St Leger (1896) 13 SC 101. 
60
 The question does not appear to have been considered between 1902 and 1910 ie between the 
annexation of the Orange Free State, which became the Orange River Colony, and the foundation of the Union. 
61
 Dunning v Quin and Others 1905 TH 35. 
62
 Stanley v Central News Agency 1909 TS 488. 
63
 SA Mails Syndicate v Hocking 1909 TS 946. 
64
 In Oliver Ripton Daniel v Huge R Denoon (1897) 18 NLR 125, the debate about veritas was 
mentioned but the question left open. 
65
 Leibenguth v Van Straaten 1910 TPD 1203. 
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had been Chief Justice of the Cape Supreme Court since 1873, and who had become the Chief 
Justice of the Republic –66 reopened the question, albeit in an oblique way, because the 
question at hand was whether truth alone could be pleaded in mitigation of [468] damages (on 
which see below);
67
 and he opined that, if he had to decide, he would be inclined to follow 
‘the view of Voet and the Cape authorities’ that ‘public interest’ had to be pleaded 
additionally to truth. 
 That indeed the position of the Cape Colony was adopted by South Africa as a whole 
is difficult to deny, although interestingly an element of uncertainty continued to float for 
some time after the establishment of the Union. The Orange Free State Provincial Division of 
the Supreme Court declared the question open in Van Wyk v Steyn (1924)
68
 and then in 
Toerien v Duncan (1932);
69
 and the Appellate Division could be seen to have lent some 
authority to that position when, under the pen of Innes CJ, it wrote in Sutter v Brown (1926) 
of ‘assuming that truth apart from the element of public benefit is not in itself a complete 
defence’.70 On the academic side, this doubt can be seen to surface until the seventh (and last) 
edition of McKerron on Delict.
71
 
 It is however difficult to see how this could be the case given that the defence was 
either stated or plainly assumed in a number of judgments, both at provincial level in 
Patterson v Engelenburg (1917),
72
 Kennedy v Dalasile (1919)
73
 and then Verwoerd v Paver 
(1943);
74
 and more importantly at Appellate Division level, first two years after Sutter v 
Brown in Johnson v Rand Daily Mails (1928),
75
 then in South African Associated Newspapers 
                                                 
66
 On him see Girvin op cit note 51 at 119–21, E Kahn Law, Life and Laughter (1991) 41–5, A A 
Roberts A South African Legal Bibliography (1942) 356–7.  
67
 Below, 23. 
68
 Van Wyk v Steyn 1924 OPD 68 at 72, referring to Preller v Schultz op cit note 23: ‘it is ... unnecessary 
to enter upon the controversial point, so fully discussed in Preller v. Schultz, whether the defence need by the 
Roman-Dutch law prove anything more than the truth of the words complained of as being defamatory’. 
69
 Toerien v Duncan 1932 OPD 141 at 142: ‘It is still an open question whether public benefit is a 
necessary element in the defence of justification in Roman-Dutch law. See van Wyk v. Steyn’ (De Villiers JP). 
70
 Sutter v Brown 1926 AD 155 at 172. 
71
 R G McKerron The Law of Delict. A Treatise on the Principles of Liability for Civil Wrongs in the 
Law of South Africa 7 ed (1971) at 186 note 28. The same point was made in earlier editions. See also 
Amerasinghe op cit note 7 at 84. 
72
 Patterson v Engelenburg & Wallach’s Ltd 1917 TPD 350 at 353: ‘In order to succeed on a plea of 
justification the defendant must prove truth and that it was for the public benefit’ (referring to Voet). 
73
 Kennedy v Dalasile 1919 EDL 1 at 8–9: it is ‘self-evident’ that the defendant ‘must prove that the 
words spoken were true in substance and in fact, and that it was for the public benefit that they should be 
published’. 
74
 Verwoerd v Paver & others 1943 WLD 153: the court mentioned (at 157) that it is certainly ‘in the 
public interest’ to publish the words complained of if they were true, which assumes that it is a requirement of 
liability. 
75
 Johnson v Rand Daily Mails 1928 AD 190 at 204: ‘If ... the words are proved to be substantially true, 
and for the public benefit, no damages could be awarded’. 
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v Yutar (1969),
76
 in Mahomed v Kassim (1973)
77
 and – after the Appellate Division [469] 
became the Supreme Court of Appeal – in Yazbek v Seymour (2001)78 and in Independant 
Newspapers Holdings Ltd v Sullivan (2004).
79
 Assuming an element of slight doubt might 
have been plausible until 1928, it would not have been after that. 
   
(b)  Rationale 
 
Why, then, did South African law settle on that position? This question can receive at least 
two sorts of answers, from the internal perspective of the legal system in question or from an 
outside perspective. Let us consider South African law’s self-understanding first. 
 Perhaps the most striking thing, in this respect, is that the balance between authorities 
and policy considerations as possible sources appears throughout the history of South African 
law to be heavily skewed towards authority. In the earlier days, the question that dominated 
judgments was what the Roman-Dutch writers had to say on the question; later, what earlier 
judgments had decided. This is not to say that principled considerations did not appear, but 
they were secondary and offered as subsidiary reasons to back up the identified legal 
authorities. In one sense, of course, there is nothing surprising with that; courts are not meant 
to re-open questions on their merits each time they arise anew. However, the contrast is 
striking with English law, where much of the equivalent debate was carried out before the rule 
of precedent hardened in the 19
th
 century, and a much greater willingness to engage with 
policy considerations can be seen on the part of courts.  
 The only South African case where a sustained attempt was made at justifying the 
position reached by the law is, perhaps unsurprisingly, the minority judgment in Preller v 
Schultz –80 in other words, the one case where a judge was actually called upon to justify, in 
the face of opposition, the validity of the otherwise dominant rule in the South African 
colonies. Even so, it is interesting to note that the one policy argument put forward by Steyn J 
was the same one that English opponents to veritas have brought up time and again, to the 
                                                 
76
 South African Associated Newspapers Ltd and Another v Yutar 1969 (2) SA 442 (A) at 452: ‘That 
then [ie the truth of the statement], apart from public interest ... was what the appellants had to prove’. 
77
 Mahomed v Kassim 1973 (2) SA 1 (RA) at 9: ‘It must now, I think, be accepted as settled law that 
Botha v. Brink correctly states the defence of justification and that, in order for a defendant to succeed in this 
defence, he must show not only that what he said of the plaintiff was true, but also that what he said was for the 
public benefit’. 
78
 Yazbek v Seymour 2001 (3) SA 695 (E). The defence is assumed throughout, eg at 698 and 701. 
79
 Independant Newspapers Holdings Ltd v Sullivan 2004 (3) SA 137 at [34]. 
80
 Preller v Schultz 10 Cape LJ 175 (below, 23). 
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exclusion of virtually any other:
81
 the fact that it is wrong to rake up (or, alternatively, 
gratuitously to rake up) the past offences of wrongdoers attempting to live down their earlier 
life.
82
 Modern South African law has not self-reflectively explained why it has opted for the 
[470] defence of truth for the public benefit; essentially, it has been content to live on the 
authority of Paul as mediated by Roman-Dutch writers. This is certainly remarkable from a 
jurisdiction whose unique position at the crossroads of the world’s two great traditions has 
given rise to such a prolific, and generally self-questioning, body of legal scholarship.
83
 
 
(c)  Analysis 
 
As mentioned, this desire to let offenders live down their sinful past is a concern which – 
whether worthy of support or not – has to my mind nothing to do with the protection of 
reputation. It really is an attempt to protect the claimant’s privacy, which itself is a species of 
dignitas not fama.
84
 If this is true, then the position of South African law can be seen, like the 
one by which English law has oftentimes been tempted, as an attempt to bring other concerns 
than reputation into its law of defamation. This is naturally not surprising if one remembers 
the conceptual framework within which the South African law of defamation operates, 
namely, as part of the actio iniuriarum. As explained, in modern South Africa as in Roman 
law, the law of defamation is the law of iniuria as it applies to infringements of fama. It might 
be spoken of as a self-contained province of the law but it is not. Technically, what a claimant 
does when he sues ‘in defamation’ before a South African court is bring an actio iniuriarum.  
 This is bound to be significant because, the moment the action is framed as an iniuria, 
and more specifically – to use Roman law’s own taxonomy – as an iniuria verbis (that is to 
say, an insult committed by words), a whole body of principles is brought into play that does 
not fit easily with the general principles of a ‘law of defamation’ – a later concept which has 
been superimposed onto the law of iniuria. If one thinks, as modern English law does, in 
                                                 
81
 Descheemaeker op cit note 33 at 11ff.  
82
 On this point, see also below, 26. Along the same lines, one could mention Mason J’s argument in 
Dunning v Quin and Others op cit note 61 at 39 that the defence of truth simpliciter would ‘afford a most 
undesirable encouragement and protection to the blackmailer’ (cited in Leibenguth v Straaten op cit note 65 at 
1207). 
83
 This paragraph focused on courts; but the same imbalance can be seen in textbooks and other 
scholarly works. For instance, Jonathan Burchell’s opus, the most detailed treatment of the law of defamation 
ever to have been written in the country, goes no further than stating the same idea according to which ‘[t]here 
comes a time when the ashes of the past must be left to die’ (Burchell op cit note 13 at 210). 
84
 Descheemaeker op cit note 33 at 17ff. The argument does not appear to have been made in the 
context of South African law. See however Groenewald v Homsby 1917 TPD 81 at 85, which comes close to it 
(citing judgment at first instance); also Burchell op cit note 13 at 210. 
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terms of the protection of deserved reputation, then veritas as a defence follows as a logical 
consequence; but if one thinks, as the Romans did, in terms of contumelious behaviour, then 
truth is prima facie irrelevant and will only bite when, coupled with an additional element, it 
becomes sufficient to negate the required mental element without which there can, by 
definition, be no contempt.
85
  
 The result of this logic is plainly to be seen in South African law until the [471] 
present day. The problem of South African law is that it has, at heart, a law of verbal injuries, 
which it has inherited from Roman law. Under the combined influence of Grotius and English 
scholarship, it later carved out a concept of defamation (‘iniuriae famae’, as it were); but it 
left unaddressed the frictions caused by the fact that the two categories, while overlapping 
very significantly, are not the same. Most but not all defamations are verbal injuries; most but 
not all verbal injuries are defamatory. Moreover, they do not follow entirely the same logic. 
The question whether veritas convicii excusat exposes this tension, as it makes sense within 
one analytical framework but not the other: within a law of verbal injuries, truth is irrelevant 
in itself but can be part of the rebuttal of the necessary intention to insult; within a law of 
defamation understood as the protection of deserved reputation, it is an analytical necessity. 
But to what logic does the category of ‘truth for the public benefit’ answer? In itself, none that 
can be identified. If the purpose of the action is to protect the plaintiff’s deserved reputation, it 
is too narrow. If the purpose is to protect his reputation whether deserved or not, or his 
privacy, it is too wide. If it is to redress contumelious behaviour, it is absence of animus 
iniuriandi – of which truth for the public benefit is only an imperfect approximation –86 which 
should avail as a defence. The scope of the defence in the modern law belies the fact that 
South African law still thinks (if imperfectly) in terms of verbal injuries, not defamation. 
Thus, if it wants to move from the law of contumelious behaviour that it has inherited from 
Roman law to the law of injuries to reputation that it claims to be having, it will need to 
detach the protection of fama from the actio iniuriarum and, among other adjustments, work 
out the consequences of what this means in terms of the defence of justification. 
 
                                                 
85
 Above, 5.  
86
 Imperfect for the reasons noted above (at 8). It is important to note that, the defence (justification) of 
truth for the public benefit having ossified from the excuse of lack of animus iniuriandi, the latter has become 
irrelevant: the defendant will not fail in his defence, if indeed his words were true and objectively for the public 
benefit, even if he spoke out of an improper, evil or spiteful motive: see Williams v Shaw (1884) 4 EDC 105 at 
148; Burchell op cit note 13 at 215–16 (with the caveat of SA Mails Syndicate v Hocking op cit note 63, where it 
was – puzzlingly – suggested that in some extreme circumstances an improper motive might defeat the defence 
of truth for the public benefit). 
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(3) A dissenting strand: truth simpliciter 
 
While it is fair to say that the defence of truth for the public benefit has been the settled 
position of South African law since its very beginnings and that, while tested, it has never 
been seriously threatened or in danger of losing its position, it remains true that a dissenting 
strand can be heard or seen in the background, challenging in a variety of ways, not the 
domination, but the hegemony of the settled position. In that respect, South African law can 
interestingly be seen as a mirror image of English law, where the same sort of relationship 
between a dominant position and a minority group of dissenters [472] that refuses to rally 
could be observed – but with truth simpliciter swapping places with truth for the public 
benefit. 
 
(a)  A judge-scholar and his posterity 
 
The dissent to the settled position of Roman-Dutch in the southern African colonies has 
essentially one name, that of Melius de Villiers,
87
 younger brother to John de Villiers.
88
 
Melius was both a judge, having served on the High Court of the Orange Free State and then 
as Chief Justice of the State, and a scholar, most noted for his Roman and Roman-Dutch Law 
of Injuries (1899), a translation and commentary of Voet’s own commentary on book 47 title 
10 of the Digest. Voet’s authority was naturally considerable in South Africa, and De Villiers’ 
book quickly established itself as a work of reference with great authority of its own.
89
 On the 
specific topic of truth in the law of iniuria, however, De Villiers was not afraid of standing in 
a minority of one. His book was in effect an all-out attack against the unwillingness of the law 
to recognise truth simpliciter as a defence to a defamation or a verbal injury.
90
 As far as 
Roman law is concerned, he did not hesitate to write there that ‘there can be no doubt that in 
Roman law as a general rule the truth of a statement which in itself would be defamatory if 
untrue, was a sufficient justification for its utterance’.91 To this ‘general rule’ he only 
                                                 
87
 On him see Girvin op cit note 51 at 114, E Kahn op cit note 66 at 45–6, A A Roberts op cit note 66 at 357. 
88
 Above, note 66. 
89
 Percival Gane spoke of it as ‘a most admirable and spacious disquisition on the title’: P Gane The 
Selective Voet (1957) 201. 
90
 I use both terms even though they are not synonymous, because difficulties with the defence of 
veritas stem largely from the friction between them – see above, section ‘analysis’. De Villiers does not appear 
to have identified the problem; and he certainly did not discuss it. His starting point had, following Voet, to be 
iniuria and, within iniuria, iniuria verbis; but in his commentary, he adopts the perspective of defamation 
throughout. 
91
 De Villiers op cit note 16 at 103. 
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recognised one exception, which is when an ‘obligation of secrecy’ existed. (It can be doubted 
whether this ‘exception’ actually has anything to do with the law of defamation. It seems 
rather that, for De Villiers, truth always justified a defamatory statement but there were other 
legal principles that might forbid the speaking of true matters, which naturally no-one would 
deny.) On the authority of what he perceived to be the Roman law, he then dismissed the 
contrary position of Voet and, from there, went on to declare himself to be ‘justified in 
adopting [the rule] that, except where an obligation of secrecy exists, it is the absolute right of 
every person to speak the truth’.92  
 Having reached this position of principle, Melius de Villiers could then start 
explaining away contrary judgments from the Cape Colony, placing heavy reliance instead on 
a case from the High Court of the Orange Free State: Preller v Schultz (1892).
93
 Perhaps 
surprisingly, the majority opinion of this judgment from a court which played a comparatively 
minor role in the shaping of South African law, and representing a very minoritarian position 
[473] in the land, was given the honour of being reproduced, despite its length, almost in 
extenso. (The minority opinion had no such luck.) Even more surprisingly, De Villiers did not 
see it apposite to inform his readers that the Chief Justice presiding over the High Court in 
that case was no other than his good self acting under another hat. The judgment – the only 
one in the history of South African law to have recognised truth simpliciter as a defence to an 
action for defamation or verbal injury –94 develops on the same line of arguments as the book 
later would, heavier emphasis being however laid on policy grounds in order to supersede the 
views ‘so varying and divergent’95 of Roman-Dutch writers. There is no need to engage with 
the substantive argument in the present context, except to point out that this judgment had no 
following beyond the veil of doubt that it cast upon the dominant position through much of 
the 20
th
 century.
96
  
 
(b)  Mitigation of damages 
 
Whereas, subject to the above caveat, truth simpliciter was never accepted as a good 
justification to an action in defamation, it is interesting to note that it was readily accepted as 
                                                 
92
 De Villiers op cit note 16 at 108. 
93
 Preller v Schultz op cit note 14. 
94
 Same remark as above, note 90. De Villiers starts his judgment from the vantage point of the actio 
iniuriarum, but then switches to ‘character’, ‘good name’ and ‘fame’ as categories of reasoning. 
95
 De Villiers op cit note 16 at 119. 
96
 Above, 18. 
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a factor to be taken into account when it comes to quantum of damages: if the defendant had 
no reputation to speak of in respect of the incrimination complained of, damages will be 
reduced (to the discretion of the Court, although presumably they could not be brought down 
to nil). The leading judgment on the question is the case of Leibenguth v Van Straaten in 
1910, where Bristowe J declared that ‘a man of bad character has not so much to lose as a 
man of good character’. De Villiers JP opined that ‘although truth would not be a sufficient 
justification, it can be pleaded in mitigation of damages’. ‘To my mind’, he added, ‘that is 
perfectly sound’. 
 I would however submit that it is not. Bristowe J’s reasoning proves, in effect, either 
too much or too little. If one accepts that damages in defamation are meant to compensate 
reputation in so far as it deserved – on the particular point at stake – then a man who was 
truthfully injured in his fama (in the wider sense) should receive no damages at all, for he has 
lost nothing that is legally protected. This would be tantamount to recognising truth 
simpliciter as a defence. But, as was seen,
97
 the position that truth is not in itself a defence is 
by construction the reverse side of the proposition that defamation protects reputation whether 
deserved or not (at least prima facie, there can exist justification or excuses). It is difficult to 
see how, in logic, there could be a middle ground between these two positions: either the law 
of defamation protects reputation simpliciter, in which case – unless a defence applies – the 
man of ‘bad character’ will receive the ordinary [474] quantum of compensation for the injury 
caused by the publicity given to his wrongdoing through the publication of the statement; or it 
protects reputation grounded in character, and then he will receive nothing. There does not 
appear to be any coherent analytical basis on which he could receive something in between.
98
 
 This stance taken by the law on mitigation of damages, which we might want to 
describe as ‘pragmatic’, reveals to my mind that South African law is unable to live up to its 
own logic. It does not want to recognise truth simpliciter as a defence, out of a (prima facie 
laudable) attempt to protect people against the malicious or gratuitous injury that could be 
                                                 
97
 Above, 7. 
98
 This point might be worth emphasising since it is counter-intuitive. Even someone who is happy with 
the proposition that defamation protects reputation in the wider sense (i.e. whether deserved or not) is likely to 
consider that the non-thief who has been called ‘a thief’ has lost more than the actual thief. While it is possible 
that this would be true in terms of non-reputational interests (for example privacy), it is incorrect as far as 
reputation is concerned. The loss – that is to say the diminution, or potential diminution, of one’s esteem in the 
eyes of the community – is the same in both cases. (Two complications arise here, but they both cut across the 
divide between true and false incriminations: one is that the extent of the injury will depend on how plausible the 
alleged facts are; the other is the extent to which these facts might already be known within the community.) The 
reason why the point presently made is not readily accepted is that we cannot accept that the truth of the 
defamatory statement would really be indifferent – that is to say, we cannot escape the proposition that 
defamation ought to protect deserved reputation, even when, de lege lata, the law takes a different stance.  
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made to their reputation – a form of enforced forgiveness on the part of the community, at 
least in the external for –; yet it cannot accept the natural consequence of this position, which 
is that wrongdoers might receive money damages from even good-faith members of the 
community who would disclose their wrongdoing outside the objective boundaries of public 
interest. An English author had put the same concern more bluntly when he spoke of 
‘mak[ing] a profit of [one’s] bad fame’.99 The position of Roman-Dutch law is coherent (if 
ultimately wrong in my mind); but the position of South African law on mitigation of 
damages seems to give away the fact that it is practically untenable. This can be seen as an 
indirect vindication of the defence of veritas. 
 
(c)  The meaning of ‘public benefit’ 
 
One point which has not been given much thought in the debate, perhaps because it is obvious 
and what is obvious tends to be overlooked even when it is important, is that the scope of the 
defence of truth for the public benefit depends on the breadth of, and therefore the meaning 
given to, the concept of ‘public benefit’. It is easy to see that, the broader the concept of 
public benefit is defined, the broader the defence becomes and the closer it will get to the 
defence of truth simpliciter. At the extreme, if anything uttered was [475] considered to be 
ipso facto for the public benefit, then the categories of ‘truth of the public benefit’ and ‘truth’ 
would, in fact, coincide. The point is all the more important because ‘public benefit’ is not a 
category that most people would readily understand in a similar way. It has little intrinsic 
meaning; in fact, it is difficult to think of a legal construct which has a wider range of 
plausible understandings.  
 This is not the place to engage into an in-depth examination of the content of the 
notion of ‘public benefit’ (or ‘interest’) in South African law; but a few remarks can 
profitably be made. The first one is that the concept has never been defined in South African 
law, either by courts or scholars. The inquirer who turns to cases and textbooks to find out 
more will typically be greeted with the rather unhelpful proposition that what amounts to 
public benefit is a question of fact that is highly dependent on all the circumstances of the 
case.
100
 Beyond that, what might be given is a list of situations where facts have been held to 
                                                 
99
 ‘Least of all will [the law] allow such a person lucrari ex mala fama,—to make a profit of his bad 
fame’ (F Holt The Law of Libel 2 ed (1816) 271). 
100
 Eg Neethling op cit note 49 at 166 (‘Generally public interest in a defamatory remark will depend on 
the circumstances of each case as well as the convictions of the community (boni mores) at that particular time’); 
Mahomed v Kassim op cit note 77 at 9 (‘In deciding whether what was said was for the public benefit all the 
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be, or not to be, in the public interest.
101
 (Interestingly, the example most frequently advanced 
in both types of literature of matter which is not for the public benefit is the raking up of past 
offences:
102
 this is the very same example that has been brought up, time and again, by 
opponents to veritas in the English debate.)
103
 Litigation on this point has been in fact 
remarkably scarce before the higher courts. When issues relating to the defence of truth for 
the public benefit come up, it is usually around the first limb that debates revolve. The cases 
concerning the defence often involve the recent criminal conduct of an individual or the [476] 
behaviour of clearly public figures, about which there would be little scope for argument on 
the ‘public benefit’ part of the test.  
 The second remark is that, while the requirement of public benefit clearly has some 
bite, in that defendants do fail on this account, the dominant impression when one tries to 
infer general principles from casuistic case law is that the bite is limited. This is reflected in 
Gronewald v Homsby (1917),
104
 perhaps the only case before the Supreme Court where there 
was an argument – not within the court, but at a distance with the view taken at first instance 
– around what constitutes public interest or benefit. A man had committed adultery, in a small 
settlement, with a woman whose husband was away. The defendant, a close friend of the 
husband, complained to the superintendant. The facts were admitted to be true by both parties; 
but was their disclosure in the public interest? At first instance, the magistrate held that they 
were not because the plaintiff did not have a public position and lived privately. This was 
reversed in the Supreme Court, which obviously held to a wider understanding of public 
benefit, albeit in no clear way. One judge mentioned that, although the claimant was a private 
man, his adultery was public and the defendant had therefore acted in ‘good faith’ in reporting 
                                                                                                                                                        
circumstances surrounding the publication must be taken into account’); Van Wyk v Steyn op cit note 68 at 71 
(‘the question whether a particular thing is in the public interest is not a question of law but a question of fact, 
which can hardly be determined by appealing to Voet or to any other authority. It falls to be determined by 
reference to conditions and circumstances which vary from century to century and from country to country’); 
Stanley v Central News Agency op cit note 62 at 491 (‘It would be impossible to give an exhaustive statement of 
the subjects which a court would hold to be of public interest, and it is not desirable to endeavour to do so. 
Obviously such a list must change from time to time, according to the changing conditions of society and the 
circumstances’). 
101
 The most complete, if now outdated, overview of authorities is provided in ARB Amerasinghe 
Defamation in the Law of South Africa and Ceylon (c 1969) Ch 31. See also Neethling op cit note 49 at 154–5. 
102
 Eg Neethling op cit note 49 at 154; Graham v Ker op cit note 59 at 187. This might need to be 
limited, as in England, by an additional factor – perhaps the non-gratuitousness of the disclosure. Thus, in 
Patterson v Engelenburg op cit note 72 at 361, Wessels J opined that ‘a scandal cannot be raked up unless it is 
done for the public benefit’, suggesting that it is in fact possible for a past transgression to be revived in the 
interest of the community. If we accept that public benefit is very largely a mirror image of lack of malice, this is 
essentially the position of England after the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act (above note 43). 
103
 Descheemaeker op cit note 33 at 11ff. 
104
 Groenewald v Homsby op cit note 84. 
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it (thus reintroducing considerations of animus within the defence);
105
 another simply held 
that in the face of such ‘gross immorality’ the defendant had been ‘justified’ in making the 
defamatory statement;
106
 as to the last, he opined that, even though disclosing immorality 
would not qualify per se as being for the public benefit, it was, in that particular case, ‘in the 
interest of that little community that things like this should not happen’ (the idea presumably 
being that disclosing the facts would go towards bringing the adulterous relationship to an 
end). Reading between the lines, the requirement of the court seems to be that there should be 
a ‘good reason’ to speak, whether that good reason be the fact that the disclosure of the fact 
was not pointless – objective justification – or that it was not malicious – subjective excuse. In 
one word, perhaps, that it should not be gratuitous (or vexatious). This is a hurdle to jump for 
the defendant, but a comparatively low one. 
 Significantly for the present argument, there is at least one line of thinking that favours 
an even lower hurdle and thus, mechanically, an even greater proximity as defences between 
truth ‘for the public benefit’ and truth simpliciter. It is best exemplified in the suggestion, 
which has been described as the ‘locus classicus’107 of the law relating to the defence of truth, 
that Lord de Villiers CJ made in Graham v Ker: ‘As a general principle’, he wrote, ‘I take it to 
be for the public benefit that the truth as to the character or conduct of individuals should be 
known’.108 (He then went on to carve out an exception[477]  to that general principle, namely, 
the ‘unnecessary revival of forgotten scandals’.) Behind an opposite starting point, this is in 
fact strikingly close to the position of English law. In that sense, John de Villiers’ position 
could be regarded as a challenge to the traditional position of Roman-Dutch law as effective 
as that of his brother Melius attacking the very nature of the defence. While John de Villiers’ 
position cannot be said to represent the law of South Africa, it remains true that both this line 
of thinking and the generally low hurdle which the requirement lays before defendants trying 
to avail themselves of the defence represent a challenge to the traditional position of Roman-
Dutch law and its underlying justification. It is, perhaps, another indirect vindication of 
veritas.  
 
 
IV  CONCLUSION 
                                                 
105
 At 85 (see also above, 4). 
106
 At 84. 
107
 Mahomed v Kassim op cit note 77 at 9 (Beadle CJ). 
108
 Groenewald v Homsby op cit note 84 at 187.   
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South African law settled early on the Roman-Dutch position that, in an action for injury to 
reputation, the truth of the defamatory allegation would not justify apart from an element of 
‘public benefit’. This has remained the law until the present day. Interestingly, however, that 
– undefined – element of public benefit has been rather loosely construed, and truth 
simpliciter has been allowed to be pleaded in mitigation of damages, the combined effect of 
which being to give, in practice, a foothold to the defence of veritas. The epigraphed sentence 
at the start is emblematic of this discreet but real foray made by the defence of truth 
simpliciter in South African law. English law, on the other hand, recognised the validity of the 
plea of veritas as early as the 16
th
 century but was never entirely satisfied with its own 
position and, in the end, partially gave in to accommodate what had long been the main 
criticism framed by opponents to the sufficiency of truth, namely, that former wrongdoers 
should be allowed to live down their past. Thus, when looking at South African and English 
law on the question of what justifies a defamatory statement, we find ourselves in the 
situation, not unfamiliar to the comparatist, of two legal systems starting from opposite 
premises but each moving, below the surface, towards the position of the other, ending up 
with not so dissimilar positions. This prompts the conclusive question of this article: if the 
dominant strand of South African law is unquestionably rooted in Roman law through 
Roman-Dutch commentators, can its ‘dissenting strand’ be attributed to English influences?  
 One always has to be cautious when examining intellectual genealogies, for influences 
and, even more so, the lack thereof are very difficult to prove or disprove. But what one can 
say after having examined the facts is that, on this particular issue, there is no good evidence 
of borrowing – in either direction. While it is transparent when reading the cases that the 
conflicting position of English law was known and appreciated, there are few documented 
attempts on the part of counsel to introduce it into the law of the land; and these never 
prospered. Reliance remained heavily on Roman-Dutch sources; and there is no sense that this 
would be no more than lip service. As to the leading opponent to the Voetian position, [478] 
he was exclusively educated in South Africa and would go on to become Professor of Zuid-
Afrikaansche Recht in Leiden.
109
 His brother John did spend a stint in England, being called 
to the bar by the Middle Temple; and it is true that he has often been charged with unduly 
borrowing from English sources.
110
 Influence is therefore not to be ruled out; at the same 
time, the fact that others had the same inclination without any English tropism, while no 
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 Girvin op cit note 51 at 114. Leiden is the very place where Voet had studied. 
110
 See eg Girvin op cit note 51 at 120. 
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similar challenge was posed by many judges educated – at least in part – in England, means 
that it would be imprudent to infer a link. 
  Generally, in a context of what was at times an extreme tension between proponents of 
the ‘pure’ Roman-Dutch law and those of the Anglicisation of the Colony, between 
Afrikaans- and English-speaking scholars, judges and seats of learning, it is if anything the 
remarkable isolation of the truth debate from these tensions that should be noted. We do not 
find the sort of dividing line, let alone battleground, that we might have expected to find; and 
the minoritarian dissenting strand that was highlighted does not appear to be explainable on 
this sort of basis. In South Africa, as in fact in a mirrored way in England, we find two camps 
with two broadly coherent positions; in both cases, we have a majority imposing its position 
early on, and a minority that never manages to reverse the status quo yet does not give up and 
obtains some concessions from the other party. But, just as it would seem absurd to describe 
English law as a mixture of the ‘pure’ common law and civilian thinking because of Fitzjames 
CJ
111
 and the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act,
112
 so it appears rather misguided to speak of 
South Africa as a mixed legal system on this particular point. Rather, there is in both 
jurisdictions an – unhappy – coming together of two principled positions; but these are 
philosophical positions, in particular on the value of truth and that of oblivion, rather than 
emanations from two legal traditions (even if it is true that, historically, these have dovetailed 
into one another). While neither system is entirely satisfied with its own position, and tensions 
are visible in both, South African law has remained firmly committed to the choice made two 
thousand years ago by the Romans: veritas convicii non excusat. 
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 Above, note 39. 
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 Above, note 43. 
